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15 November 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 November 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sudan - Sino-Soviet Bloc: In accepting a recent Soviet gift of five armored personnel carriers, the Sudanese military government may be showing a willingness to accept future bloc offers of significant aid. Sudanese officials, despite a comprehensive US program to assist them with radio communications, have also accepted in principle a Chinese Communist gift of two powerful (50-kw.) shortwave radio transmitters. In addition, private Sudanese buyers are negotiating with a Soviet mission for the purchase, on government account, of 100,000 tons of wheat.

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Okinawa: [In the legislative elections on 13 November, the pro-Communist Okinawa People's party suffered a major defeat, losing four of its five seats in the Ryukyu Islands legislature, and the conservative Liberal-Democratic party won 22 of the 29 seats. The Liberal-Democrats won 50 percent of the popular vote, the middle-of-the-road Socialist Masses 32 percent, and the People's party 15 percent. The conservative victory is a marked reversal of the 1958 election outcome when the pro-Communists received 28 percent of the popular vote--an expression of the then considerable Okinawan dissatisfaction with US policies.]

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\*Guatemala: Loyal Guatemalan forces have apparently dislodged insurgent forces from one and possibly both of the key provincial capitals they seized on 13 November. However, armed insurgent bands of undetermined strength remain at large and, if able to establish a guerrilla redoubt, they could become a serious long-term threat. Barring additional defections of military units or extensive civilian popular backing for the revolt--which has thus far been lacking--the Ydigoras regime appears likely to survive the immediate crisis. OK

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## LATE ITEM

\*USSR: The USSR announced on 14 November that beginning in January 1961 a new gold content will be established for the Soviet ruble, raising its present official exchange rate of one ruble for US \$.25 to one ruble for US \$1.11. The move establishing the ruble for foreign trade at a slightly greater value than the US dollar is essentially a move to enhance Soviet prestige and will have little practical effect on Soviet foreign trade and aid programs, which are computed largely on the basis of free world prices. This move is an amplification of a general currency and price reform announced by Khrushchev last May. Under this program, the principal aim of which is to simplify accounting procedures, ten present rubles are to be exchanged for one new ruble starting in January and domestic prices are to be cut to one tenth their present level. OK

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Sudanese Government Accepts First Bloc Aid

In accepting a Soviet gift of five armored personnel carriers, the Sudanese military government may be showing a willingness to accept future bloc offers of significant aid. The Sudanese Government is expected to display the carriers in the 17 November parade celebrating the second anniversary of its assumption of power.

Sudanese officials have accepted in principle a Chinese Communist offer to give the Sudan two powerful (50-kw.) short-wave radio transmitters, despite a comprehensive US program to assist the Sudan in this field. The Chinese Communists have a demonstrated capability of furnishing effective aid in radio-communications equipment. Private Sudanese buyers are negotiating with a Soviet mission for the purchase, on government account, of 100,000 tons of wheat. This, however, is within the framework of the Soviet-Sudanese trade agreement.

The Sudanese Communist party is meanwhile attempting to create a common front with the stronger political parties and with dissident army elements. Its aim is to establish a united opposition strong enough to overthrow the Abboud military regime. Sudanese Communist leaders may press for a demonstration of strength during UAR President Nasir's ten-day state visit, which begins on 15 November.

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### Pro-Communists Lose Ryukyu Islands Election Battle

[The pro-Communist Okinawa People's party (OPP) suffered a major defeat in the Ryukyu Islands legislative elections on 13 November, losing four of its five seats. The conservative Okinawa Liberal-Democratic party (OLDP) gained 22 of the 29 seats, the middle-of-the-road Okinawa Socialist Masses party (OSMP) won five seats, and one went to an independent candidate.]

[The conservative victory is a marked reversal of the 1958 election outcome in which Okinawan dissatisfaction with US policies, particularly the amount and method of payment for land used by US military forces, resulted in a combined majority vote for the leftists and the OSMP. In the 1960 contest, the OPP campaigned on anti-American themes but failed to arouse popular response largely because the land policy has since been revised.]

[The OPP, which gained 28 percent of the popular vote in 1958, received only 15 percent, this year. The OSMP increased its share from 25 to 32 percent, but because of the vote distribution it won five seats fewer than in 1958. The conservatives, through disciplined organization and an intensive campaign, increased their number of seats by eight, although their popular vote rose only 2 percent.]

[Limited steps to foster Japanese assistance to the Ryukyus in the fields of education and technical development figured importantly in the elections by allaying fears that the US is seeking to detach the islands completely and irrevocably from Japan. Sentiment for reversion to Japan is widespread throughout the Ryukyus, nevertheless, and will continue to be exploited by both Japanese and Okinawan politicians.]

[The conservatives are expected to control both the executive and legislative branches and will probably seek the continuance of OLDP leader Seisaku Ota as Ryukyuan chief executive.]

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